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XVYOMING LAW JOURNAL

v. Yancey. 36 In this case the plaintiff's reputation was being visciously and
systematically ruined by her spurned lover, and the lower court had denied
her an injunction on the ground that there were no property rights involved. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the property right doctrine
was notable mainly by its breach rather than its observance, and proceeded
to enjoin the defendant from ever again speaking or writing to the plaintiff,
or from ever speaking or writing about her to anyone else, or from ever
molesting her in any way. The court refused to look for the usual fictitous
property right and granted the injunction on the grounds that a person's
personal life is worth just as much to her as her property, and is equally
deserving of protection. Coercion, malice and intimidation, as well as a
right of privacy could also have been found in this case, but the court
chose to ignore them all, and relied on a statute allowing injunctive relief
in any proper case.3 7 The court felt that justice was more important than
preserving an outmoded rule with fictions and exceptions.
With a little backsliding here and there3 8 this opinion represents the
tendency of the courts today. The realization that prevention of libel and
slander in a proper case is far superior to a questionable cure in the law
side of the court is becoming a fact. Whether the courts issue the injunction on the finding of a property right, or the finding of one of the
exceptions to the rule requiring a property right, or only because they
want to prevent a gross injustice, there is a trend in this country away
from the outdated English dictim.
DONALD L. YOUNG

REACHING THE CHARITABLE INSTITUTION
In 1846 an English court stated in a dictum that an institution performing a charitable function was not liable in a tort action for damages instituted by the injured plaintiff.'
Twenty years later the English courts
reversed themselves 2 but the American courts, evidently overlooking the
reversal, resurrected the then dead rule.3 So rose the doctrine of charitable immunity, which came to be sustained under such a varied rationale
that it became an almost impregnable defense barring plaintiff's recovery.
The increased application of the rule and the resulting failure of plaintiffs
to avoid it was noted with growing concern. Both lawyers and judges have
called upon their contemporaries and the legislature to analyze its value
in the twentieth century world. A few courts have recently repudiated
the doctrine, 4 but the change has been gradual and the number of juris36.
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dictions still giving a complete or qualified immunity5 indicates the transition is far from complete. The purpose of this article is to indicate to a
plaintiff's attorney the necessary research in attempting to avoid the rule
of immunity or to take advantage of its exceptions, and to state the arguments for the modern rule imposing liability.
Initially the institution itself may be attacked as being noncharitable.
The organizatio" is required to plead and prove' that it is charitable. This
is often done by introducing the corporate charter 7 but in addition there
must be a showing that the institution is presently charitable.s To conform to the legal definition of a charity the organization must show that
it benefits some segment of the general public." If this is not introduced
the court will consider it a private charity antd recovery is allowed.' 0 However, benefits may accruc only to specified classes, and yet the organization
remains charitable in nature."' The test is concerned with the indefiniteness of the group rather than its size.' 2 If the fund is for named beneficiaries, even though for educational or religious purposes, the trust is
considered too definite and noncharitable."3 An organization composed
of an exclusive membership deriving funds from assessments rather than
contributions, and only incidentally benefiting a few, has been held to be
4
noncharitable.1
Secondly, many courts grant only a qualified immunity. In such a
jurisdiction plaintiff's recovery is dependent upon a correct analysis of
his relationship to the charity. Generally plaintiffs are separated into
three main groups: strangers to the charity,' 5 servants or employees of the
charity', and recipients of the charity, 7 paying and nonpaying. A visitor
of a hospital patient,' 8 a volunteer fireman taking a patient to the hospital,' 9 or a nurse employed by a patient2 0 have been held to be strangers
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to the charity and able to recover against it. An employee of the charity
has also been considered a person without its benefits and allowed to
recover. 2 ' Finally recipients of a charity have been classified as paying
and non-paying. The general rule is that liability will not be determined
upon the question of whether the patient did or did not pay. 22 However a
patient who pays for services stands a better chance of being considered
23
apart from the "beneficiary" classification than a nonpaying patient.
Some jurisdictions, one of which is Wyoming,2 4 allow recovery only
when the charity has been negligent in selecting its servants. It is sufficient
to allege that an employer was negligent in employing and retaining an
incompetent servant. 25 Once this is denied, recovery hinges on the selection of competent and relevant evidence of the servant's negligence and the
employer's actual or implied knowledge of that fact. 26

Proof that the

employee lacked intelligence to perform the job, 27 that the employee was
insufficiently instructed in his duties 2S or a showing of specific acts of
incompetency and bringing them home to the knowledge of the master or
company 29 has been enough to show that an employer should have known
of an incompetent employee.

A careful attorney should also be prepared

to show that these negligent acts were related in time and occurred frequently.30

For an employee to be incompetent there must be sufficient

repetition of his negligent acts to charge those around him with knowledge; since even the prudent person is occasionaly negligent."
Another possible argument is that the institution is insured and the
loss will not fall on it or deplete its funds.' 2 It could be contended that
charitable corporations which are insured should bear their share of the
burden. Some courts hold that there can be no absolute immunity, or
even a qualified immunity, if the organization is protected by insurance;
since protection of the trust fund has been the reason for the rule of
absolute immunity."

At. present the position of the Wyoming Supreme

Court on the question of the effect of liability insurance on an immunity
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34
is uncertain. There is somne indication that the immunity disappears,
35
but some immunities have been held to be unaffected.

Finally the court should be asked to consider the reasons for liability.
It has been ably argued that the big business aspect of modern charitable
institutions, and continued expansion of charities, make them able to bear
the losses they cause without hampering their charitable activities.3 6
Charities and charitable work, along with nearly everything else in the
American scene, have found it relatively easy to enlarge. In view of this
tremendous growth it is logical to assume that more attention should be
directed to the needs of the particular plaintiff in relation to the ability
of that particular charity to give him some relief.
Other jurisdictions have found additional support for holding a charity
to the standard of absolute liability. Kansas considered charitable immunity in relation to the State Constitution and concluded that the immunity doctrine was contrary to the Bill of Rights of that state.37 Another
jurisdiction has imposed liability, and for one of its reasons stated that it
is for the legislature, not the courts, to create and grant immunity13
The above mentioned suggestions are not the real solution, however.
They only constitute some of the methods by which an injured plaintiff
has won his case. Ultimately lawyers and judges should redefine the term
"charitable institution." There has been a considerable change in ninety
years from the struggling, one-doctor, temporary locations to the modern
institution staffed by many personnel and efficiently operated. At their
inception a money judgment would have destroyed the majority of charities. Today that form of reasoning is not true. They are larger, more
capable of paying and in most instances protected by insurance. Until
these basic propositions are recognized the plaintiff's attorney must attempt
to categorize the institution and the plaintiff into some isolated channel
where the mantle of immunity momentarily loses its protective power.
JOHN

34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

D.

FLITNER

McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943). In the McKinney case
three separate views were expressed concerning a husband's immunity in a suit
instituted by his wife. Blume, J. argued that a wife could sue her husband if
liability insurance existed.
Ball v. Ball, 73 Wyo. 29, 269 P.2d 302 (1954). The Ball case involved parental
immunity in the father-sin relationship. It was held that such a suit was contrary
to public policy and the presenec of insurance made no difference. Price v. State
Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309 (1945).
In the price case the
court felt insurance had no bearing on the case since the Commission could not
consent to a suit against the state when the law did not permit such a suit.
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954): President and
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142 (1951).

